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The Miranda Prohibition: A
Narrowing Standard to Control
Police Conduct
Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
The admissibility of the product of police interrogation of a sus-
pect after his arrest and prior to his arraignment is one of the most
controversial issues in American criminal procedure.' In Miranda
v. Arizona,2 the United States Supreme Court observed that custo-
dial interrogation contains "inherently compelling pressures"
which undermine the individual's will and which may force him to
speak when he would not do so otherwise.3 Therefore, the Court in
Miranda held that any suspect in custody4 facing interrogation
must be informed of his constitutional rights,5 including the right
against self-incrimination 6 and the right to counsel.7 If the suspect
1. Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel:
Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. I REV. 62, 67
(1966).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 467.
4. For a discussion of the various tests for determining custody, see LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitutiow Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MICH. L. REv. 40, 100-06 (1968). See also Smith, The Threshold Question in
Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REV.
699, 706-35 (1974).
5. Prior to any interrogation, the suspect must be warned that: he has the right
to remain silent; any statement he does make may be used against him in a
court of law; he has a right to an attorney; and if he cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479.
6. The fifth amendment states that "[n]o person shall... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fifth amendment was held applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
7. The sixth amendment states that "[i] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VL The sixth amendment was held applicable to the
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invokes his fifth amendment right to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease at once.8 If he invokes his sixth amendment right
to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent.9
Recently, in Rhode Island v. Innis,'0 the United States Supreme
Court faced the difficult problem of distinguishing between volun-
tary confessions, which are admissible in court, and coerced con-
fessions, which are inadmissible due to improper custodial
interrogation. The decision in Innis provided a long-awaited"
guideline for determining when police conduct falls within the Mi-
randa prohibition.12 The Court's test included an objective in-
quiry into the likely effect of police conduct on a typical person in
the suspect's position,' 3 and a subjective inquiry as to whether the
police should have known of any special characteristics of the sus-
pect which would make him susceptible to their conduct.' 4
The purpose of this note is to probe the rationale used in Innis
for determining when police conduct in obtaining a confession is
classified as an "interrogation" within the prohibitions of Miranda.
First, the history of the "interrogation" issue will be examined,
with emphasis upon the current trend in Supreme Court rulings
on the admissibility of confessions. Second, the Innis decision it-
self will be reviewed. Finally, the protections afforded by the fifth
and sixth amendments and the problem of determining when
these protections attach will be considered.15
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
9. Id. at 474.
10. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
11. For a general discussion of the need for standardized guidelines in determin-
ing whether police action is "interrogation," see Bator & Vorenberg, supra
note I (calling for legislative guidelines), and White, Police Trickery in Induc-
ing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L REV. 581 (1979) (calling for judicial guidelines).
12. There are exceptions to this general prohibition. After the required warnings
have been given, the suspect may "knowingly and intelligently waive these
rights.. . ." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479. There are also some spe-
cific, judicially-created exceptions to Miranda. See generally Chavez-Marti-
nez v. United States, 407 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1969) (international border customs
procedures); F.J. Buckner Corp. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1968) (license
revocation proceedings); North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969) (ex-
tradition proceedings); County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1971)
(drunken driving situations); State v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441, 291 A.2d 2 (1972)
(welfare investigations). See also Note, Michigan v. Mosley: A Further Ero-
sion of Miranda?, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 861, 875 (1976).
13. For an analysis of the Court's test, see notes 71-134 & accompanying text in-
fra.
14. Id.
15. It is "not enough to mechanically attempt to ascertain what 'interrogation'
means without considering the rationales behind Miranda and the fifth and
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11. THE HISTORY OF THE INTERROGATION PROBLEM
In the landmark case of Brown v. Mississippi,16 the United
States Supreme Court held that evidence obtained through torture
was inadmissible. Since then, the Court often has faced the prob-
lem of confessions extracted by police coercion. Although rarely
admitted into evidence, in the past confessions have been obtained
by means of such physical atrocities as whipping,'7 beating,18 and
hanging by the neck.' 9 The modem trend in police tactics for ob-
taining confessions has been to replace such physical interroga-
tions with psychological techniques. 20 The Supreme Court has
recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical2 ' and
has held that psychologically oriented interrogation techniques
can render a confession inadmissible even in the complete ab-
sence of physical abuse.22 However, the continued prevalence of
the use of police trickery to induce confessions is evidenced both
by recent Supreme Court cases23 and by police interrogation
manuals.24
The admissibility of confessions has been determined upon the
rationale of either the fifth amendment right to silence or the sixth
amendment right to counsel. Until 1964, the admissibility of a con-
fession in a fifth amendment case was based upon a "voluntari-
ness" test,25 which in turn was determined by examining the
"totality of the circumstances." 26 The "totality of the circum-
sixth amendments." Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 226, 252 A.2d 575,
578 (1969).
16. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
17. Williams v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. Rep. 87, 225 S.W. 177 (1920).
18. People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578, 136 N.E. 470 (1922).
19. Edmonson v. State, 72 Ark. 585, 82 S.W. 203 (1904).
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 448.
21. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
22. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
23. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (confession obtained after
suspect was told falsely that his fingerprints were "found at the scene of the
crime"); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (confession obtained after
suspect was informed falsely that he was named as the gunman by another
suspect).
24. See generally White, supra note 11, at 582 n.2 (citing F. INBAU & J. REID, CRiMI-
NAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 1967); C. O'HARA, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (4th ed. 1978); R. ROYAL & S. SCHUTr, THE
GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION (1976); C. VAN METER,
PRINCIPLES OF POLICE INTERROGATION (1973)).
25. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). For a general discussion of the
"voluntariness" test, see C. McCoRmcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§§ 147-50 (2d ed. 1972).
26. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519
(1968); Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S.
707 (1967).
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stances" included such factors as age, sex, race, physical disability,
psychological abnormality, intoxication, education, and experience
with police procedures. 27
In 1964, the Supreme Court, in Escobedo v. Illinois,28 replaced
the "totality of the circumstances" test with a relatively definite
per se rule.2 9 The Court held that if the police failed to inform a
suspect of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,
any statements made by the suspect while in custody would be
inadmissible.3 0 This movement toward a per se analysis was ad-
vanced further in Miranda, when the Court held that failure to
warn a suspect of four specific rights would render any subsequent
confessions inadmissible3 ' and that all interrogation must cease
immediately if the suspect invokes his rights to silence or coun-
sel.32
The shift to more concrete guidelines probably reflected a de-
sire to relieve the federal courts of the burdensome case-by-case
review of the subjective "voluntariness" test, and a dissatisfaction
with that test's inability to adequately protect against increasingly
sophisticated methods of circumventing the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination.33 Miranda expressed concern about
the prevalence of such interrogation techniques as questioning the
suspect in private in order to prevent distractions and deprive him
of any outside support.3 4 Other techniques used to induce confes-
sions involved discounting the seriousness of the offense, blaming
either the victim or society,35 or offering the suspect legal excuses
for his actions. 36
However, the Supreme Court's decisions in the post-Miranda
era have revealed a substantial shift in judicial control over police
interrogation in fifth amendment cases. In essence, the Court has
moved away from the per se rationale of Miranda and toward the
pre-Miranda standard of voluntariness. 37
27. See C. McComcn, supra note 25, § 149, at 319-20.
28. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (defendant was taken into custody and interrogated prior
to his indictment. He was not informed of his right to remain silent, and his
request to consult with an attorney was denied).
29. The Supreme Court had rejected a per se analysis in earlier cases. See, e.g.,
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959); Cicencia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504,
509-10 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1958).
30. 378 U.S. at 490-91.
31. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479. See note 5 supra.
32. 384 U.S. at 473-74. See notes 8-9 & accompanying text supra.
33. C. McComvncn, supra note 25, § 151, at 326-27.
34. 384 U.S. at 455.
35. Id. at 450.
36. Id.
37. See generally George, Future Trends in the Administration of Criminal Jus-
1981]
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The trend began in 1971 with Harris v. New York.38 In Harris,
the police questioned the defendant while he was in custody with-
out advising him of his right to counsel.39 The defendant later was
indicted for selling heroin and subsequently testified in his own
behalf at the trial.40 After his testimony, his prior inconsistent
statements to the police during custody were admitted to impeach
his credibility.41 The Supreme Court held that incriminating re-
marks made by a suspect were admissible for impeachment pur-
poses despite the defective Miranda warnings. 42
The trend continued in Michigan v. Tucker,43 where the Court,
while recognizing that the suspect should be free from compulsion,
held that, if only the Miranda procedural guidelines had been vio-
lated, then in the absence of any compulsion the per se rule would
be replaced by a balancing test. This test would weigh the need to
deter undesirable police conduct against the court's need for "all
concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party
seeks to adduce."44
In 1975, the Court further eroded the impact of Miranda by
sanctioning renewed questioning of a suspect only two hours after
he had invoked his right to silence.45 In Michigan v. Mosley,4 6 the
Court held that the suspect's right to silence is not violated by re-
newed interogation if: (1) performed by a different police officer;
(2) preceded by a fresh set of Miranda warnings; and (3) re-
stricted to a crime which is different in nature, place, or time.47
Thus, the tendency of the Burger Court4 8 (and many lower federal
and state courts4 9) has been to erode Miranda by slowly cutting
away at its per se guidelines.
The admissibility of confessions has not been determined
solely upon fifth amendment grounds. Recently in Brewer v. Wil-
liams,50 the Supreme Court established that, in addition to the
protections afforded by Miranda, some suspects have an in-
dependent sixth amendment right to the presence of counsel dur-
tice, 69 MIL L. REV. 1 (1975) (attributes the shift to the contrasting policies of
the Warren and Burger Courts).
38. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
39. Id. at 224.
40. Id. at 223.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 225-26.
43. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
44. Id. at 450.
45. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 107 (1975).
46. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
47. Id. at 104-07.
48. See George, supra note 37, passim.
49. See note 12 supra.
50. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
[Vol. 60:416
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ing interrogation.51 In Williams, the defendant had been arraigned
in Davenport, Iowa, for the abduction of a ten-year-old girl in Des
Moines, Iowa. The police officers assigned to transport the defend-
ant to Des Moines had agreed, upon request of the defendant's
Davenport attorney, not to question the suspect during the trip.52
However, during the trip one of the officers intentionally sought to
learn the location of the girl's body.53 Knowing that the defendant
was deeply religious and that he had a history of mental illness, 54
the officer made what is now known as the "Christian Burial
Speech,"5 5 thereby persuading the defendant to disclose the loca-
tion of the body without actually "questioning" him.56 The
Supreme Court held that the defendant's incriminating remarks
were inadmissible because his sixth amendment right to counsel
had been violated:57 the police officer's "Christian Burial Speech"
was tantamount to interrogation, and the defendant was entitled to
51. "[T] here is no need to review in this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona,
a doctrine designed to secure the constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination.. . . [Ilt is clear that ... Williams was deprived of a differ-
ent constitutional right-the right to the assistance of counseL" Id. at 397-98.
52. Id. at 391-92.
53. The police officer admitted at Williams's trial that he had deliberately set out
to elicit all the information he could before Williams consulted with his attor-
ney. Id. at 399.
54 Id.
55. The "interrogating" officer addressed his suspect as "Reverend" and said-
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling
down the road. . . .Number one, I want you to observe the weather
conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very
treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early this evening.
They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that
you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's
body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get
snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we
will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel
that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little
girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was
snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I
feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting
until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and
possibly not being able to find it at all.
Id. at 392-93.
56. After making his "Christian Burial Speech," the police officer said to the sus-
pect: "I do not want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it further. Just
think about it as we're riding down the road." Id. at 393.
57. Williams actually challenged the admissibility of his incriminating state-
ments on both fifth amendment Miranda grounds and sixth amendment
right-to-counsel grounds. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Iowa 1970).
However, the United States Supreme Court found that the statements were
inadmissible on sixth amendment grounds and did not consider the applica-
tion of the Miranda doctrine. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397-98.
1981]
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the assistance of counsel when the speech was made.5 8
In essence, Williams reaffirmed Massiah v. United States,59
which had held that "once adversary proceedings have com-
menced against an individual, he has a right to legal representa-
tion when the government interrogates him."60 Although Williams
revived the application of sixth amendment protections to sus-
pects, its holding left the law concerning confessions unclear; as in
every pre-1980 Supreme Court case dealing with the admissibility
of confessions, the Williams Court had failed to define with any
degree of certainty what constitutes "interrogation." The stage
was set for Innis.
I. THE FACTS OF INNIS
In the early morning hours of January 17, 1975, a man carrying a
sawed-off shotgun robbed a Providence, Rhode Island taxi driver.
The driver was able to identify a picture of Thomas J. Innis as that
of his assailant. At approximately 4.30 a.m. the same morning, In-
nis was arrested and advised of his rights, as required by Miranda.
He did not have the shotgun in his possession then. When more
officers arrived at the scene of the arrest, he was advised of his
Miranda rights twice more. After stating that he understood his
rights and that he wished to see a lawyer, Innis was placed in a
police car with three officers, who were instructed specifically by
their captain not to question, intimidate, or coerce their suspect in
any way.61
While en route to the police station, Patrolman Gleckman be-
gan talking with Patrolman McKenna about the location of the
missing shotgun, stating that there were "a lot of handicapped chil-
dren running around in this area, and God forbid one of them
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt them-
selves." 62 The suspect interrupted the conversation and told the
officers to "turn the car around so he could show them where the
gun was located."63 At that point they had traveled no more than
one mile in the police car.64 When they returned to the scene of the
arrest, the defendant was given his Miranda rights for the fourth
58. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397-98.
59. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah also held that "custody" was irrelevant for sixth
amendment purposes. See generally LaFave, supra note 4 Smith, supra note
4. But cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477-78 (establishing "custody" as a
requirement for fifth amendment protections).
60. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 401.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 1686.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1687.
64. Id.
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time, and he replied that he understood.65 He then led the police
to the hidden gun, because, he said, he "wanted to get the gun out
of the way because of the kids in the area in the school."
66
Despite the defendant's objections, the trial judge allowed both
the shotgun and testimony concerning the defendant's connection
to it into evidence on the ground that the defendant had knowingly
and intelligently waived his Miranda rights when he helped the
police find the gun.67 Innis then was convicted of kidnapping, rob-
bing and murdering a different cab driver.68 On appeal the Rhode
Island Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision on the
ground that Officer Gleckman's statement was an impermissible
"interrogation."69 The court also held that the defendant had not
waived his Miranda rights.70
IV. THE HOLDING OF INNIS
The United States Supreme Court71 identified the sole issue of
Innis as whether the defendant had been "interrogated" in viola-
tion of his fifth amendment right to remain silent.72 The Court
held that "interrogation," for Miranda purposes, 73 included police
conduct which is either "express questioning or its functional
equivalent." 74 The first prong of this definition was quickly found
to be inapplicable: the Court felt that the conversation between Pa-
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The defendant was convicted of the murder of a cab driver killed January
12, 1975. See id. at 1686-87. None of the charges related to the robbery of the
cab driver whose identification led to Innis's subsequent arrest. See id.
69. State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (RI. 1978).
70. Id. at 1163-64.
71. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at
1686. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment only. Id. at 1691. Jus-
tice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Brennan joined. Id.
at 1692. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which he proposed a
more objective test based solely on the effect of the police conduct. Id. at
1693-98.
72. Id. at 1688. Because the Court decided that Innis had not been "interrogated"
for Miranda purposes, it found no need to reach the question of whether In-
nis had waived his Miranda rights. Id. at 1688 n.2. For an analysis of waiver
of a suspect's Miranda rights, see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See
also Note, The Right to Counsel and the Strict Waiver Standard, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 543 (1978).
73. The definition of "interrogation" in Innis is based upon fifth amendment Mi-
randa principles. The Court noted that because of differing underlying poli-
cies, the definitions of "interrogation" under the fifth and sixth amendments
are "not necessarily interchangeable." 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4. See notes 102-34
& accompanying text infra.
74. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
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trolmen Gleckman and McKenna contained no express question-
ing and was "nothing more than a dialogue between the two
officers, to which no response from the respondent was invited."7 5
The second prong-"interrogation" can be found in police conduct
which is the "functional equivalent" of a direct question-con-
sumed the rest of the decision.
The Court defined the "functional equivalent" of express ques-
tioning as "words or actions on the part of the police officers that
they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response."7 6 In deciding whether the police officer should
have known that his conduct was likely to elicit an incriminating
response, the Court focused on the suspect's perceptions, taking
into consideration any peculiar characteristics of the particular
suspect known to the police officer.7 7 Applying the "functionally
equivalent" portion of the two-pronged test to the facts of Innis,
the Court held that Innis was not "interrogated" in violation of Mi-
randa because it had not been established that the police officers
knew that Innis was peculiarly susceptible to a "few off-hand re-
marks." 78
V. ANALYSIS
A. A Fifth Or A Sixth Amendment Case?
The Court in Innis noted that the definitions of "interrogation"
under the fifth and sixth amendments are "not necessarily inter-
changeable."79 In fact, the sixth amendment definition encom-
passes a wider spectrum of conduct than does the fifth amendment
definition.80 As a result, incriminating information resulting from
similar police conduct in two different cases may produce conflict-
ing outcomes. The information obtained by the police may be ad-
missible in a fifth amendment right-to-remain-silent case and
inadmissible in a sixth amendment right-to-counsel case.
The factual situation of Innis, decided on fifth amendment
75. Id. at 1690. But see Respondent's Brief Opposing Certiorari at 6 ("Mr. Innis
contends, as he has always contended, that Officer Gleckman's comments
were a deliberate attempt to elicit incriminating information from an ex-
hausted suspect.").
76. 100 S. Ct. at 1690 (emphasis in original). An "incriminating response" is any
inculpatory or exculpatory response that the prosecution may seek to intro-
duce at trial. Id. at 1689 n.5.
77. Id. at 1689-91.
78. Id. at 1690 & n.8, 1691.
79. Id. at 1689 n.4.
80. See notes 102-07 & accompanying text infra.
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grounds,81 is so similar to that of Williams, a sixth amendment
case,82 that a plausible argument can be made that Innis should
have turned upon the same reasoning as used in Williams.83 The
cases shared several factors: (1) both defendants were informed
of their right to counsel before they made incriminating state-
ments; (2) both defendants revealed the location of incriminating
evidence while being escorted in police custody; and (3) both de-
fendants made incriminating statements for humanitarian reasons
and not in response to direct questioning.
However, two important differences distinguish the two cases.
First, the police officer spoke directly to Williams, while the police
officer in Innis was speaking to another officer and was overheard
by the defendant.84 Second, Williams had been formally arraigned
and had been represented by counsel before the incriminating re-
marks were made, 85 while Innis had not yet been arraigned and
was not yet represented by counsel.86 It is this second difference
which makes Williams a sixth amendment case.87
According to Innis, the lack of a formal charge against the de-
fendant will prohibit the application of the sixth amendment.88
However, many commentators believe that the sixth amendment
right to counsel should be triggered when the police give Miranda
warnings to a suspect and when he subsequently invokes his right
81. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
82. See note 51 supra.
83. See State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (RI. 1978). While the Rhode Island Supreme
Court did not base its decision on the sixth amendment right to counsel, it
did adopt the reasoning on interrogation found in Williams. See also White,
Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of His Right
to Counsel, 17 AM. CRnm. L. REv. 53 (1979) (suggests a resolution of Innis
based upon sixth amendment grounds).
The United States Supreme Court, however, based its decision upon the
rationale of Miranda and the fifth amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
84. Whether the police officers deliberately intended to elicit incriminating state-
ments from the suspect is unclear. See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
85. '"The sixth amendment would not have applied [in Williams] had the Daven-
port police not arraigned Williams." Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to
Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions,
17 AM. CRne. L. REv. 1, 9 (1979). See also notes 88-101 & accompanying text
infra.
86. A third difference lies in the fact that Innis was warned again of his Miranda
rights before actually disclosing the location of the gun, while Williams did
not receive such additional warnings. The extra set of warnings gives rise to
the argument that even if the suspect had been improperly interrogated for
either fifth or sixth amendment purposes, he validly waived his rights after
receiving the extra set of warnings. The waiver issue is beyond the scope of
this note. See note 72 supra.
87. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
88. Id.
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to counsel.89 In Escobedo v. Illinois,90 the Court applied the sixth
amendment to at least some instances of custodial interrogation.9 '
The Court stated that the right to counsel attached as soon as "the
process shifts from investigatory to accusatory."92 This would
seem to include the giving of the Miranda warnings, because po-
lice generally view the suspect as a "prospective defendant" rather
than as a participant in a continuing investigation once the warn-
ings are given.93
There are certain advantages to attaching sixth amendment
protections to the suspect when the Miranda warnings are given.
Law enforcement authorities can manipulate the commencement
of formal proceedings in order to delay attachment of the defend-
ant's right to counsel.9 4 Furthermore, police objectives and tactics
are likely to be the same at both the time of arraignment and of
arrest,95 because it is likely that police will be as firmly committed
to prosecution when the arrest is made as they are when charges
are formally instituted.96 Also, neither a suspect's perception of
his relationship with the state nor his actual need for an attorney
will necessarily turn upon whether formal proceedings have com-
menced.9 7 When an arrested suspect invokes his right to counsel,
he expresses his "own view that he is not competent to deal with
the authorities without legal advice."98 Such a view indicates that,
from the suspect's vantage point, adversary proceedings against
him actually have commenced.99
By refusing to apply the sixth amendment in Innis, the Court
has reaffirmed that Escobedo is no longer good case law.OO Innis
89. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 84-85 (1964); Herman, The Supreme
Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Onio ST. L.J. 449, 490-91
(1964); Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interro-
gation? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 79-83 (1978); Traynor, The Devils
of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. Cm I REV.
657, 673 (1966);.White, supra note 11, at 590-93; Developments in the Law-
Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 935, 1006 (1966); Note, The Right to Counsel Dur-
ing Police Interrogation" The Aftermath of Escobedo, 53 CAn. L REV. 337, 349
n.66 (1965).
90. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
91. See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959).
92. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 492.
93. White, supra note 83, at 59.
94. Kamisar, supra note 89, at 81.
95. White, supra note 11, at 591.
96. Id.
97. White, supra note 83, at 59.
98. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975) (White, J., concurring).
99. White, supra note 83, at 59-60.
100. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion). In Kirby, Justice
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demonstrated that the sixth amendment right to counsel will not
attach at any point before the suspect has been formally charged.
As a result, a defendant such as Innis, who wishes to exclude from
evidence incriminating remarks made before he has been formally
charged, must rely solely on the fifth amendment. This works to
the defendant's disadvantage because improper police interroga-
tion is defined more narrowly for fifth amendment purposes than
for sixth amendment purposes.101
B. The Interrogation Issue
Innis clearly indicated that the process of determining whether
police conduct constitutes prohibited "interrogation" depends on
whether the particular case is based on the fifth or the sixth
amendment.102 The definitions of "interrogation" differ for fifth
and sixth amendment purposes because the policies underlying
the two separate constitutional protections are distinct.103 Be-
cause the fifth amendment is concerned with compulsion,104 "in-
terrogation" for fifth amendment purposes encompasses conduct
which is so compelling that it forces the suspect to make incrimi-
nating remarks which otherwise he would not have made. 0 5 For
sixth amendment purposes, "interrogation" is defined more
broadly as conduct which is likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse.106 This definition follows sixth amendment policy: inter-
rogation techniques which are inconsistent with the accusatorial
process should be prohibited.107
1. "Interrogation"--The Fifth Amendment Definition
The fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation applies to any suspect who is both in "custody" and the sub-
ject of "interrogation."108 Although the requirement of "custody"
has not sparked much controversy,109 the "interrogation" issue has
Stewart, writing for the plurality, referred to Escobedo as a "deviation" from a
long line of sixth amendment precedent. Id. at 689. The Court observed that
it has come to view Escobedo, in retrospect, as a fifth amendment case rather
than as a sixth amendment right-to-counsel case. Id.
101. Kamisar, supra note 89, at 41-55 (cited with approval in Rhode Island v. Innis,
100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4).
102. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
103. Id.
104. Kamisar, supra note 89, at 41-55. See note 101 supra.
105. 10O S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477-78.
109. See note 4 supra.
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caused extensive debate." 0 Innis attempted to settle the debate
by holding that "interrogation" occurs when the suspect is sub-
jected to either direct questioning or its "functional equivalent.""'
The Court defined the "functional equivalent" of direct question-
ing as "words or actions on the part of police officers that they
should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat-
ing response."11 2 The "should have known" language allows for a
degree of subjectivity in the test.113
The Court's test presents two serious problems. The policy be-
hind the subjective "should have known" standard is to prevent a
guilty suspect from avoiding prosecution simply because he is un-
usually responsive to remarks casually made by a police officer.
But, in establishing this standard, the Court has sacrificed control
over the officer who intentionally attempts to elicit an incriminat-
ing response by appealing to any characteristics to which the sus-
pect may be unusually susceptible, but of which the officer has no
knowledge."l 4 This possibility is not unlikely: officials may con-
sider interrogation techniques which are not expressly prohibited
to be legitimate 115 and will interpret, apply, and push to the limit
the constitutional doctrines expounded by the Supreme Court.116
The Court's test, which in essence allows the police to take un-
likely "longshots" in the hope of obtaining incriminating informa-
tion, 1 7 is a continuation of the current trend to erode the base of
black-letter Miranda118 and is certainly a departure from the Mos-
ley rule of "scrupulously honor [ing]"119 the suspect's rights to si-
lence and counsel.
Innis's definition of "interrogation" should be qualified, so that
110. See generally Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 1; White, supra note 11.
111. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
112. Id. at 1690 (emphasis in original).
113. The courts traditionally have declined to use a totally subjective test for Mi-
randa purposes. See United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969)
("[A]ny formulation making the need for Miranda warnings depend upon
how each individual being questioned perceived his situation would require a
prescience neither the police nor anyone else possesses."). See generally
White, supra note 11, at 596-97.
114. 100 S. Ct. at 1695-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the majority opinion
assumed that "where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating
response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one
which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that ef-
fect." Id. at 1690 n.7 (majority opinion). The majority's assumption fails to
consider the possibility of an aggressive police officer. See notes 115-19 & ac-
companying text infra.
115. White, supra note 11, at 581-98. See also id. at 598 n.112.
116. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
117. See 100 S. Ct. at 1696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. See generally notes 37-60 & accompanying text supra.
119. 423 U.S. at 104. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 60:416
POLICE INTERROGATION
its test would conform more closely with the fifth amendment's
concern over compulsion. The subjective "should have been
known" portion of the Court's test should be used to exclude the
suspect's incriminating remarks when the police officer had reason
to know that his conduct was reasonably likely to elicit a response.
However, the "should have known" standard should not be used to
allow incriminating remarks into evidence when the police officer
has no reason to know that the suspect would be susceptible to his
conduct, but gambles that he might be, although that is the clear
implication of the Court's language.
To better understand this qualification of the Court's definition
of "interrogation," assume a hypothetical case which is factually
similar to Williams, except that the suspect has not spoken to
counsel and has not been arraigned (thus shifting the focus from
the sixth amendment to the fifth). In such an example, the Innis
rationale would hold that "interrogation" has occured because the
officer giving the "Christian Burial Speech" "should have known"
that he was appealing to the susceptible beliefs of the deeply reli-
gious suspect. Now, to these facts add the assumption that the po-
lice do not know of the suspect's deep religious beliefs or of his
history of mental illness, the hypothetical officer delivers a "Chris-
tian Burial Speech" to the suspect with the intent of obtaining an
incriminating response, and, as in Williams, the deeply religious
suspect incriminates himself. Under Innis, the Supreme Court
would focus on the perceptions of the suspect, taking into consid-
eration any peculiar characteristics of the particular suspect's per-
sonality which are known to the police. Because the officer had no
reason to know of the suspect's deep religious convictions, the
Court will not consider them. Thus, nothing shows that the officer
should have known his words were reasonably likely to elicit the
incriminating response from the suspect (who outwardly appears
typical), and the remarks will be admissible in court. The police
officer's gamble was successful, because his suspect had a lower
resistance to the compulsion than would a typical suspect.
Another problem with the Court's test is that of its willingness
to use the police officer's intent to determine whether he "should
have known" that his conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response.120 In order to apply this standard, the courts
will be required to discern the police officer's perception of the sit-
uation. For litigation purposes, determining a police officer's sub-
jective intent is a very difficult task.121 In cases involving the
120. Under the Court's test, the significance of the officer's intent is not clear. The
Court merely states that the officer's intent is not irrelevant. Rhode Island v.
Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.7.
121. See generally Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 188 n.1 (1968) (Harlan,
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Miranda warnings, the courts have been reluctant to focus upon
the suspect's subjective perceptions;122 focusing upon the police
officer's actual intent would be equally difficult.123 Furthermore,
focusing on the subjective intentions of the police fails to recognize
that Miranda was concerned with compulsion from the viewpoint
of the suspect. 124
2. "Interrogation"--The Sixth Amendment Definition
The Supreme Court has never formulated a precise test for dis-
cerning violations of the sixth amendment right to counsel.125 Al-
though Innis based its decision on fifth amendment principles, the
decision does provide some insight into this question. Apparently,
the Innis Court approved of Professor Kamisar's theory that a fifth
amendment violation occurs when police conduct exerts a compel-
ling influence on the suspect and that a sixth amendment violation
occurs when the police conduct is likely to elicit an incriminating
response. 2 6 It follows that the type of conduct which violates the
sixth amendment right to counsel is a broader category than the
type of conduct which violates the fifth amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination.
The sixth amendment protections, as established in Massiah v.
United States,127 apply whenever police officers, without the pres-
ence of counsel, "deliberately elicit" incriminating information
from a suspect after he has been charged formally.128 Kamisar ar-
gues that "interrogation" is irrelevant for sixth amendment pur-
poses; after commencement of formal judicial proceedings, 2 9 it is
necessary only that the suspect "be approached by persons acting
on behalf of the government in the absence of counsel."13o
Kamisar's theory seems to be consistent with that of the
J., concurring and dissenting) (inquiry into police knowledge and motivation
entails "substantial administrative difficulties").
122. See note 113 supra.
123. White, supra note 83, at 66-67.
124. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[A] standard hinging
on the inner intentions of the police would fail to recognize Miranda's con-
cern with the coercive effect of the 'atmosphere' from the point of view of the
person being questioned.").
125. White, supra note 83, at 66.
126. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
127. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah also held that "custody" was irrelevant for sixth
amendment purposes. See generally note 4 supra. But cf. Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. at 477-78 (establishing "custody" as a requirement for fifth
amendment protections).
128. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 204.
129. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
130. Kamisar, supra note 89, at 41 (emphasis in original).
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Supreme Court. In a recent case, United States v. Henry,'13 a paid
informant was placed in a jail cell with the defendant.1 3 2 The in-
formant was instructed not to initiate any conversations with the
defendant concerning the bank robbery charges against him, but if
the defendant initiated such conversations the informant was to
listen. 3 s The Court held that the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel had been violated, because the government delib-
erately had planned an impermissible interference with that
right. 3 4 Such a holding, in effect, establishes a "hands-off" policy
in a sixth amendment case as soon as formal proceedings have be-
gun.
VI. CONCLUSION
Innis represents the continuing trend of the Burger Court to
erode the per se prohibitions of Miranda. As a result of Innis, a
defendant who attempts to exclude from evidence any incriminat-
ing remarks made before he is formally charged must now rely
solely on the fifth amendment. From the suspect's point of view,
he is now at a greater disadvantage because the scope of improper
police conduct is defined narrowly for fifth amendment purposes.
The broader sixth amendment protections are no longer available
until formal charges have been filed.
The Burger Court opinions, however, are not unwarranted. To-
day, the public seems to be more concerned with controlling crime
than with preserving the rights of suspects. 3 5 Polls indicate that
the public favors stronger measures to reduce the crime rate-
even at the expense of limiting the rights of an accused.l3 6 Before
Williams was decided, attorneys general from twenty-one states
urged the Court to overrule its procedural ruling in Miranda.137
Had the Warren Court been deliberating in today's more conserva-
tive atmosphere, it is unlikely that it would have created the rigid,
per se procedural prohibitions of Miranda.
Emmett J. McMahon '81
131. 100 S. Ct. at 2183 (1980).
132. Id. at 2184-85.
133. Id. at 2185-86.
134. Id. at 2189.
135. Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 MICH. L REV. 1320, 1424-25 (1979).
136. Id. at 1425.
137. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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